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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






DR. GEORGE PIECZENIK, 




COMMISSIONER NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF  
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;  
SECTION CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF COASTAL LAND  
USE COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT; 
JOHN DOE, persons who are employees and  
enforcement officers of the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection; MARY DOE, persons 
who are employees and enforcement officers of the  
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-07484) 
District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson* 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 1, 2017 
Before:  JORDAN, RESTREPO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 




                                              
* Judge Wolfson entered the order challenged in this appeal.  Subsequently, she recused 
from the matter.  Honorable Brian R. Martinotti now sits as the District Judge for this 






 George Pieczenik, a leaseholder of a property subject to mowing and maintenance 
restrictions on areas classified as freshwater wetlands or wetlands transition areas, filed 
suit against the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection (“NJDEP Commissioner”), the Section Chief of the Bureau of Coastal Land 
Use Compliance (“the Section Chief”), and NJDEP enforcement officers.  The mowing 
and maintenance restrictions were imposed in an administrative consent order (“ACO”) 
entered into by the property’s owner and NJDEP.  Pieczenik alleged that the restrictions 
require him to hire a lawn service that can use GPS to identify the spatial coordinates 
corresponding to protected wetlands areas.  He sought a declaration that the ACO was 
void on its face as applied to him and an order enjoining its enforcement against him 
without a proper hearing or payment of just compensation for a purported taking.  The 
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for Pieczenik’s lack of 
standing. 
 The District Court granted the defendants’ motion.  The District Court held that 
Pieczenik had no standing to challenge the ACO because all agreed that he was not a 
party to it and because the defendants expressly disavowed that any enforcement action 
                                                                                                                                                  
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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would be taken against Pieczenik based on the provisions of the ACO.1  Specifically, in 
regard to the latter, the defendants stated that they did not intend and never intended to 
hold Pieczenik liable under the ACO.  However, the defendants did not disavow a 
statement made in a letter to Pieczenik, namely that NJDEP may take legal action against 
him if he continued to mow and maintain areas that were regulated and protected by the 
Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 13:9B-1, et seq. (“FWPA”).  The 
defendants explained that the remedies they would seek would be based on Pieczenik’s 
independent violations of the FWPA as a tenant.  In light of the defendants’ statement 
and Pieczenik’s objection to the potential enforcement in his response to the motion to 
dismiss, the District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice.  The District Court 
allowed Pieczenik 10 days to amend his complaint to challenge the threat of enforcement 
of the FWPA.  Pieczenik subsequently filed a notice of appeal.2    
                                              
1 In concluding that the action was not justiciable, the District Court also relied on cases 
discussing principles related to ripeness and mootness.    
 
2 Also, before he filed his notice of appeal, Pieczenik filed a document in the District 
Court that he entitled “amended complaint, motion for reconsideration and request for a 
default judgment.”  Among other things, he stated that he would like to amend his 
complaint to include a new claim that the defendants sought to remove him from his job 
as a New Jersey professor.  He also included a motion for default judgment.  After the 
District Judge (Judge Wolfson) recused without ruling on the motion because she had 
personal knowledge of the facts underlying the new claim, another District Judge denied 
the motion for reconsideration and the motion for a default judgment because this appeal 
was pending.  Pieczenik did not file another notice of appeal or amend his notice of 
appeal.   
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3  We exercise plenary review 
over a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United 
States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the 
record.  See Erie Telecomms. v. Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 Upon review, we agree that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction 
over the complaint.  The Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to actual cases 
and controversies between proper litigants.  See Florida Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 
F.3d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steam-Ship 
Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).   
 In his complaint, Pieczenik took issue with the ACO and its application to him.  
The letter that the Bureau Chief sent him to notify him about the mowing restrictions was 
phrased ambiguously such that he could have understood it to mean that the defendants 
would take action against him based on violations of the provisions of the ACO.  
However, the defendants have expressly stated that they have never planned to, and never 
                                              
3 Although the District Court dismissed Pieczenik’s complaint without prejudice and 
allowed amendment, we may hear this appeal.  “Generally, an order which dismisses a 
complaint without prejudice is neither final nor appealable because the deficiency may be 
corrected by the plaintiff without affecting the cause of action.”  Borelli v. City of 
Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  However, the rule of Borelli 
does not apply because the dismissal was based on justiciability (lack of standing and 
ripeness), and it appears that Pieczenik cannot do anything to cure the complaint.  See Pa. 
Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 162 (3d Cir. 2007); Presbytery of N.J. of 
Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1461 & 1462 (3d Cir. 1994).  The 
District Court allowed amendment to raise a different cause of action (a state law claim 
under the FWPA) but foreclosed any challenge to the ACO by Pieczenik. 
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will, take action against Pieczenik on the basis of the ACO.  On appeal, they stress that it 
is undisputed that they never intended to hold Pieczenik liable under the ACO and that 
they agree that they cannot.   
 Because the defendants have not and will not apply terms of the ACO against 
Pieczenik, Pieczenik’s requests for the District Court to declare the ACO void on its face 
as applied to him and enjoin its enforcement against him were not justiciable.  “In order 
to present a justiciable controversy in an action seeking a declaratory judgment to protect 
against a feared future event, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the probability of that 
future event occurring is real and substantial, ‘of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’”  Salvation Army v. Dep’t of 
Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).  Pieczenik 
maintains that his suit should proceed despite the defendants’ statements because the 
NJDEP will enforce the ACO against him through his landlord.  That is, he will be 
affected by NJDEP’s imposition of the requirements of the ACO on its signatory (for 
instance, he posits that the NJDEP could take steps against his landlord and his landlord 
could be compelled to threaten eviction absent compliance).  Even putting aside whether 
the landlord is still the property owner,4 his speculation about what could happen is not 
sufficient to show a real and substantial probability of some event occurring in the future 
that his litigation could protect against.  See Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 192.  Instead, 
                                              
4 In motions separately filed, and previously ruled on, in this appeal, the parties have 
discussed a state foreclosure action against the landlord. 
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the ruling he requested from the District Court would have been impermissibly advisory.  
See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 678-79 (2016).   
 Pieczenik also argues that he was entitled to a default judgment in his favor in this 
action on the basis that the defendants did not timely respond to his complaint.  The 
defendants filed their motion within the time permitted in the District Court.  However, 
Pieczenik argues that an extension of time granted by the District Court Clerk in 
compliance with the District of New Jersey’s Local Rule 6.1 was invalid and in conflict 
with Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows the court to grant an 
extension of time for good cause shown.5  Without deciding the validity of Local Rule 
6.1, we note that Pieczenik was not automatically entitled to a default judgment based on 
when the response was filed in this case.6  Default judgments, which are disfavored, are 
left to the discretion of the District Court.  See United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. 
Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1984).  Furthermore, a district court has an 
obligation to consider its jurisdiction before entering a default judgment, see Williams v. 
Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), and it is 
                                              
5 Local Rule 6.1(b) allows the Clerk to grant one extension of time no greater than 14 
days for the filing of a responsive pleading.   
 
6 Additionally, to the extent that his argument is a challenge to the order denying the 
motion for a default judgment that he filed with his motion for reconsideration after the 
District Court dismissed his complaint, it is not clear if the issue is before us.  He did not 
file a separate appeal from the post-judgment order denying his request for a default 
judgment.  In any event, Pieczenik relied on a different argument for default judgment in 
the District Court.  See ECF No. 30 at 2.  Unless there are compelling circumstances 
7 
 
appropriate for a district court to decline to enter a default judgment or to vacate default 
judgment where the court lacks jurisdiction or questions whether it has jurisdiction.  See 
Cheeks v. Fort Myer Const. Co., 722 F. Supp. 2d 93, 112 (D.D.C. 2010); D’Onofrio v. Il 
Mattino, 430 F. Supp. 2d 431, 437-38 (E.D. Pa. 2006).   
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
(which are absent here), we do not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.  
Ross v. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union, 266 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2001). 
